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Abstract 
 
This paper develops a framework for thinking about the policy challenge of scaling up 
small scale interventions, governmental and non-governmental, that address poverty 
reduction successfully. The framework sees scaling up as addressing different components 
of market failure, government failure and civil society failure. Viewed in this way, 
constraints to scaling up can be analyzed using a supply and demand framework on the one 
hand, a political economy framework on the other. The main conclusions are: (i) in scaling 
up the provision of basic social services, it is crucial to understand whether the binding 
constraint is on the supply side or the demand side, and (ii) successful expansion of 
successful civil society organizations has to manage in different ways constraints imposed 
by the market and by the government. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Poor people are poor because markets fail them, and governments fail them.  
Market failures such as those in capital markets prevent poor people from getting adequate 
education, for example. When government steps in to “correct” these market failures, it 
often introduces its own problems, such as the capture of public resources by the non-poor, 
or the inability to monitor service providers, which leave the poor still poor.   
 
To be sure, there are many excellent examples of government interventions that 
have helped the poor in different ways.  And civil society has mobilized non-governmental 
projects and activities that have improved the lives of the affected population. But these 
cases point to a basic paradox in the discourse on poverty reduction. Despite well-known 
examples of government and non-governmental projects that reduced poverty, poverty at 
the aggregate level persists, or decreases only slowly. And attempts to replicate small-scale 
successes many fold do not necessarily succeed. 
 
 This paradox naturally raises the question of whether and how small interventions 
that work well for the poor locally can be “scaled up”. This is the sense in which we will 
use the term “scaling up poverty reduction” in this paper. There is a second sense in which 
this term is used in the discourse and that is simply in the sense of “more poverty 
reduction”. Scaling up in the first sense contributes to scaling up in the second sense, but in 
this paper our focus will be not on poverty reduction in general, but on the potential for 
poverty reduction in expanding interventions that are known to work well at the small 
scale. 
 
There are two possible approaches to studying the issue of scaling up, so defined. 
One is to examine real-life cases of interventions, especially where an attempt has been 
made to scale up successful small activities, and make an assessment of the conditions of 
success. Another is to take a more conceptual approach, asking what might be needed for 
success, or might explain failure, in a range of circumstances. More than 100 case studies 
were prepared for the Shanghai Conference on Scaling Up Poverty Reduction held in May 
2004 (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/reducingpoverty/). These case studies contribute 
greatly to building up knowledge based on specific experiences. This paper is a companion 
piece to a selection of a dozen case studies from South Asia (India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh) that are being published in this volume. It takes the complementary approach 
by developing a framework for thinking about scaling up. The framework derives from the 
understandings that emerge from the case studies, but in turn serves to better understand the 
findings of the case studies, individually and collectively. Although based on the South 
Asia case studies published in this volume (listed at the end of this paper), we believe the 
framework has broad applicability. 
 
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the framework in outline 
form. Section 3 illustrates and fleshes out the framework with the case studies in this 
volume. Section 4 looks ahead and discusses policy recommendations, for governments 
and for donors, for successful scaling up. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of 
outstanding issues on which more research and policy debate will be useful. 
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2. The Framework in Outline 
 
 The key building blocks of the framework we propose are three concepts-market 
failure, government failure, and civil society failure. The first two are well known, the third 
perhaps needs some elaboration. We propose to use these concepts to identify the gaps that 
scaling up must fill, and in this way to also identify the constraints that scaling up will face. 
 
 When markets work well, the economic system generates outcomes that are 
efficient but not necessarily equitable. When markets do not work well, the economic 
system generates outcomes that are not efficient, nor need they be equitable. A market 
system that does not work well can therefore be improved upon in theory to generate both 
“a bigger pie” and a better distribution of that pie. This is “market failure”. If the 
interventions that are needed in theory can be implemented by a benevolent, informed and 
competent government, market failure can be easily overcome. Of course in reality, 
governments are not fully benevolent, informed, or competent. Attempts to correct for 
market failure by such governments sometimes lead to the opposite of what is intended, 
with outcomes that lead to more inefficiency and more inequity. This is government failure. 
 
 In the lives of poor people, market failure and government failure are both present. 
If we take basic aspects of poor people’s standard of living like education, health and 
insurance against vulnerability, there are good reasons in theory why markets will not 
provide adequate levels of these valued components of the standard of living for the poor. 
And this is borne out in practice. A large literature documents inadequate levels of 
education and health, and excessive levels of vulnerability among the poor. These are all 
areas dogged by the problem of imperfect information. Moreover, market failure in another 
area--imperfect capital and credit markets—exacerbates the market failure in education, 
health and insurance for the poorest. 
 
 Not surprisingly, governments have attempted to address these market failures 
through interventions of various types including public provision of education and health 
facilities, and interventions in credit and other markets. These interventions have had a 
mixed record. While there are undoubted successes, there are many instances of 
government failure as well, as documented by the case studies in this volume and in the 
many case studies done for the Shanghai conference. For example, despite a notional 
commitment to universal primary education, many children do not attend primary schools, 
and many countries remain some distance from the goal of universal literacy. Similarly, on 
health, water and sanitation, government provision lags behind ideal goals in terms of 
access and quality of provision. 
 
 Just because there is some market failure does not mean that all markets fail all the 
time. Just because there is some government failure does not mean that all government fails 
all of the time. Moreover, even when markets and government both fail, perhaps especially 
when they both fail, sometimes civil society organizations step in and provide services and 
activities that fill the gap. The case studies for the Shanghai conference give plenty of 
examples of such gap filling. However, the gap is not filled completely, by a considerable 
margin—otherwise the record on poverty reduction would be stronger and more 
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widespread. This is civil society failure. One answer to this failure might be to encourage 
the expansion of civil society activities in providing basic services to the poor. But, as we 
shall see, such expansion is not without its own problems and constraints. 
 
 We are interested in implications for public policy—in other words, in advising 
governments in actions they can take, and international agencies in supporting the actions 
that governments take, in scaling up poverty reduction by confronting market failure, 
government failure and civil society failure. Let us start with market failure, and take as a 
concrete case education. It is generally accepted that levels of education in developing 
countries are too low, especially for girls. There are many reasons why a market may not 
arise naturally to provide an increase in education that is considered socially desirable. 
Returns to education are uncertain and, together with imperfect credit markets, may prevent 
adequate investment in human capital given the opportunity costs involved. Or there may 
be significant externalities and threshold effects associated with the returns to education, 
leading to low level traps where the outcome is individually rational and but socially sub-
optimal. Or the interests of parents vis-à-vis their children, especially their female children, 
may not match social ideals. 
 
 Let us then take as given that there is too little education without government 
intervention, and that it is the role of government to “scale up” educational attainment. 
What should it do? The answer depends crucially on whether the low level of education is 
due to a supply constraint, a demand constraint, or both. If there is a supply constraint, 
meaning that at current private opportunity costs the demand for education exceeds the 
supply, then the government has to focus on expanding supply to scale up. If, on the other 
hand, there is a demand constraint (parents do not want to, or cannot afford to, send their 
children to school), then expanding supply (building more schools, for example), will not 
increase the total amount of education. Resources spent on expanding education will be 
wasted. For developing countries, the typical situation starts out with excess demand. At 
this stage, expanding supply is the right policy for scaling up. But sooner or later supply 
will catch up with demand. At this point, resources will have to go into expanding demand 
as well as expanding supply, and the two will have to proceed hand in hand. Scaling up the 
response to this market failure thus requires first of all a diagnosis of the nature of supply 
and demand in relation to each other, and then a carefully staged set of matched 
interventions. If this is not done, there will surely be government failure in scaling up. 
 
 Furthermore, even if expanding supply is the right thing to do, the government may 
not be doing enough of it, or doing it badly. Monitoring and oversight of school 
construction may be weak. Teachers may be paid but may not turn up to teach. Or the 
curriculum may be wholly inappropriate. Worse, government intervention may increase 
inequity as public resources are used for the well-off at the expense of the poor. There is 
evidence of all of these government failures in the case studies for the Shanghai 
conference, and in the broader literature on education. 
 
 While the above example is developed for education, it should be clear that the 
supply/demand way of thinking applies to a whole range of issues in public services, 
including health, water and sanitation. It can also apply, for example, to credit markets. 
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There is a broad consensus in the development literature that credit constraints are 
pervasive, in other words there is excess demand for credit, and that this is inefficient and 
inequitable. The response is then to expand supply, but the question is how to do it. One 
answer is to make this the task of the government, and indeed that is the route that has been 
followed by many countries. By and large, government interventions have not been 
successful. Quite apart from problems of corruption and political interference, there is the 
basic issue that governments have not been able to solve the information and monitoring 
problems that the market faces. This government failure has left a gap, which has been 
filled in some countries by an energetic civil society sector, the micro credit sector, 
providing credit to very poor households on the basis of small loans and localized 
monitoring and control. The same is true of micro insurance. 
 
 The market-failure gap that is left unfilled, or even widened, because of government 
failure is thus filled to some extent by civil society. This is true in micro credit and micro 
insurance but it is true of myriad other activities and sectors that are deeply important to 
poor people’s standard of living—health, education, water, sanitation, agricultural 
production, etc. But civil society does something else. As well as trying to fill the gap left 
by the government and the market, it also highlights this gap in the public consciousness by 
giving voice to the voiceless. It emphasizes the consequences of market failure and 
demands public action. It then reveals failures of public action, covering malevolence, lack 
of information and incompetence. Thus, it (we are speaking here of civil society as a 
whole) simultaneously provides information on the gap, urges the government to fill the 
gap, and attempts to fill the gap itself. 
 
 The persistence of poverty demonstrates that civil society has not, up to now, 
managed to fill this gap. This civil society failure has many causes, and an understanding of 
these causes is important for making the best use of civil society in a strategy of scaling up. 
Members of civil society organizations are not themselves immune from malevolence, 
ignorance or incompetence. Policy will surely have to address these issues, especially as 
these organizations grow. Moreover, even well run organizations do not generally have the 
ear of policy makers and government bureaucrats. They cannot always get their message 
across to the authorities. We will surely have to think about instruments that better allow 
the voices of the poor, and the public generally, to be heard by those who deliver public 
services and make and implement public policy.  
 
Beyond these problems, which are present in public and private organizations alike, 
there is a structural issue. Civil society organizations operate, by definition, in the 
interstices between market and state. They interact with each, of course—many 
organizations sell the product of the poor in markets or provide marketable services, and 
nearly all organizations come under one or other set of government regulations. But their 
size effectively insulates them from the full force of markets or government. This is fine if 
the sector stays small, but that is contrary to the requirement of scaling up, of expanding 
activities by civil society organizations so that they fill more and more of the market failure 
gap that they cannot get the government to fill. 
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As civil society organizations expand to scale up poverty reduction, they will come 
up against the market on the one hand and the state on the other. For example, as micro 
credit organizations expand, the weight of their transactions will become significant 
relative to the formal capital market. Well before they expand to fill the gap they set out to 
fill, they will come under the influence, perhaps the volatility, of financial conditions 
nationally and globally. To take another example, as a small micro-insurance organization 
expands, it will eventually come on to the radar screen of national insurance regulators, 
whose rules and capital requirements are set with large formal insurance companies, 
perhaps even with the global market, in mind. Unless these rules are modified to 
accommodate the expansion of smaller scale activities, these regulations, valid as they are 
in their own terms, will strangle the expansion and hence the scaling up of micro-insurance. 
A third example: as non-governmental (and non-profit) schools expand, they may 
challenge the national school curriculum. Such challenges may be positive, if for example 
they concern the tailoring of teaching methods to rural schoolchildren, or they may be 
negative, if for example they concern the propagation of a fundamentalist religious 
ideology. In either case the challenges have to be addressed and managed. 
 
All of the tendencies noted in the analysis above are present to different degrees in 
reality. They are found in the broader literature, but especially in the case studies brought 
together in this volume. The next section takes up the task of illustrating the different facets 
of the framework developed in this section with actual examples from South Asia, covering 
topics such as: (i) market failure leading to excess supply or excess demand; (ii) 
government failure because of expansion of demand (supply) when the constraint was 
supply (demand); (iii) government failure because of malevolence, ignorance or 
incompetence; (iv) civil society attempts to fill the gap created by market failure and 
government failure; (v) market and government constraints to civil society expansion. The 
following section will then draw the lessons together for policy. 
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3. Illustrations of the Framework 
 
 Viewed through the lens of the framework outlined in the previous section, the 
twelve case studies in this volume highlight both the potential for, and the challenges of , 
scaling up poverty reduction in South Asia.  Almost all the cases stem from an underlying 
market failure—the one exception is the Self-Help Group Program in Andhra Pradesh, 
which helps government fulfill its redistributive role.  But some of them address the market 
failure squarely, while others are addressing the government failure associated with 
government’s response to the market failure. 
 
 In the first category are the e-Choupals program, Operation Flood and to a lesser 
extent SEWA in India, and Bangladesh’s microfinance initiatives.  The e-Choupals 
program tackles the inefficiency created by traders of agricultural products having power 
over farmers because of an informational advantage.  The traders have better access to 
information about prices and other things that give them monopsony power, while affecting 
the distribution of profits between trader and producer.  By bringing internet-linked 
computers to the village, e-Choupals gave farmers access to the same information as 
traders, enabling them to check on the traders’ prices, and rendering the market for oil 
seeds, inter alia, more competitive as well as more equitable.  It also helped mobilize the 
farmers, who were not organized before, so that they could withstand efforts by the traders 
to maintain the status quo.  Similarly, Operation Flood mobilized dairy farmers and their 
trading partners into cooperatives, with the power resting with the farmers.  SEWA 
mobilized informal women workers into a collective that could bargain for better working 
conditions and pay.  Finally, Bangladesh’s microfinance initiatives attacked a fundamental 
capital market failure—asymmetric information between borrower and lender—by using 
peer-group monitoring as the means of correction.   
 
 In each of these cases, the initiative did more than just correct a market failure.  It 
served as a way of mobilizing poor people.  SEWA has gone from organizing informal 
women textile workers to providing various livelihood and marketing services to its 
membership.  In Bangladesh, the weekly meetings of microcredit borrowers also served as 
a forum for information-sharing among women about family planning, child nutrition and 
health.   By addressing a particular market failure, these movements helped to solve 
another collective-action problem, namely, the coordination of poor people’s voices into a 
movement.  This was one reason why these initiatives were able to scale up as much as 
they did—SEWA has over 750,000 members, Bangladesh has 14 million microfinance 
borrowers.  But this same feature points to a potential problem for scaling up.  Both India 
and Bangladesh are democracies, which means there are established mechanisms, such as 
political parties, for organizing the collective voice of the people, including poor people.  
As these other movements, such as SEWA and the larger microfinance institutions in 
Bangladesh scale up, they approach the scale of the existing political parties, creating the 
potential for a conflict between the two types of institutions. 
 
 We turn now to the initiatives that aim to correct government failures, most of 
which were triggered by the public sector’s response to a market failure.  The Bhoomi 
project addressed a common failure in the public sector’s performing its duty of land 
 8
registration—bribery and corruption.  Land registration is a classic function of the state, as 
it is part of the protection of property rights.  Yet it was this same function that the state 
was failing to perform, because of asymmetric power relationships between farmers and 
bureaucrats and imperfect monitoring.  The Bhoomi project attempted to tackle the 
problem by computerizing the land registration system.  Not only did this dramatically 
speed up the records retrieval process, it reduced corruption and permitted the functioning 
of the crop insurance market, because claims could now be more easily verified.  
Addressing a government failure contributed to correcting a market failure (in crop 
insurance).   
 
 Similarly, in Tamil Nadu, the local government was not fulfilling its responsibility 
of providing water, sanitation and other municipal services to its citizens, even though 
these services were deemed a public responsibility, presumably because of scale economies 
in their provision.  Meanwhile, with a growing economy, demand for these services was 
outstripping supply.  Observing the excess demand, the private sector was interested in 
participating in these services, but found the risks, especially of over-regulation, too high.  
The problem was solved by a partnership between the government and the private sector, 
where the former guaranteed not to over-regulate, while the latter agreed to provide 
services even to poor neighborhoods.  A market failure and government failure were solved 
by government and the market working together. 
 
 The Education Guarantee Scheme of Madhya Pradesh (MP) provides another 
example of addressing government failure.  Education demand was clearly outpacing 
supply in MP.  However, efforts to increase supply by the traditional method of the 
government building schools and hiring teachers was not working.  Teachers were often 
absent, and the school buildings were in disrepair.  So the government decided to use the 
source of demand—the parents who wanted to send their children to school—as a means of 
strengthening supply.  For any community that requested a school, the government gave a 
justiciable guarantee to provide one in 90 days.  In addition, the community could select the 
teacher, whom the government would train.  The result was a partnership between the 
government and the community, mutually reinforcing each other, and a substantial 
improvement in education in Madhya Pradesh. 
 
 These three cases of overcoming government failure illustrate the importance of 
forming coalitions to resist the forces that created the government failure in the first place.  
In Tamil Nadu, the coalition was with the private sector; in MP, it was with the 
communities; in Bhoomi, it was with the farmers, who could now be mobilized through the 
introduction of electronic registration.  These coalitions helped the reform champions to 
overcome the vested interests, who benefited from the original government failure, and 
who would undoubtedly try to stop the change.  But they also indicate some potential 
dilemmas in scaling up.  If a partnership with the private sector is scaled up, does the whole 
enterprise become a private entity?  In this case, it might succumb to the original market 
failure that triggered the problem in the first place.  Similarly, if the partnership with the 
community is scaled up, the community might replace the government, especially the local 
government, which has been entrusted with the responsibility for education. 
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 We turn now to three cases that helped government fulfill its redistributive role, 
rather than its efficiency-enhancing role.  The Self-Help Groups in Andhra Pradesh, the 
Rural Support Program in Pakistan, and the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan.  In 
each of these, the government used community groups to monitor and implement anti-
poverty programs.  The Government of Andhra Pradesh embraced the self-help groups, 
which had formed either spontaneously or with NGO efforts, as an instrument to deliver on 
its poverty reduction program.  The Government of Afghanistan, knowing that subnational 
governments either did not exist or were subject to extreme forms of capture, decided to 
use community groups as a means of distributing funds for small infrastructure projects.  A 
similar approach was taken by RSP in Pakistan, based on the success of the Aga Khan 
RSP.  The common feature of these initiatives is that the government used a non-
governmental institution to fulfill a government function, namely, redistribution.  Once 
again, the dilemma of scaling up is whether these non-governmental institutions can 
approach a scale equal to the government, and not replace the government.   
 
 One final example, that focuses only on giving voice to poor people, is that of the 
Citizens Report Cards in Bangalore, India.  The NGO here, the Public Affairs Centre, was 
not involved in service delivery; it was solving the collective-action problem of 
information generation, by providing information about the quality of public services 
throughout the city (and later, elsewhere in India and some other countries).  The report 
cards played a crucial role in the helping poor people keep politicians accountable—
witness the significant improvement in services in Bangalore in the past five years.  In this 
sense, they were performing a role that is suited to an NGO.  This also means that the 
possibility of scaling this function up is quite high. 
 10
4. Conclusion 
 
 What are the implications of this application of our framework to the twelve case 
studies for public policy, and for donors who are interested in supporting governments in 
scaling up?  For governments, at least three sets of lessons emerge.  First, in addressing 
market failures, especially those that adversely affect the poor, governments should look 
for opportunities that also help the poor solve collective action problems.  While addressing 
the technical problem associated with the market failure, such as information asymmetry, 
look for opportunities to strengthen poor people’s ability to mobilize, to build coalitions 
that can amplify their voice in policymaking.   
 
 Second, even in cases where there is massive government failure, there is hope.  
The same government that is responsible for the government failure can form coalitions 
with other actors to develop successful approaches to poverty reduction.  The reason for the 
government failure is often a coordination problem within government, or a political 
market failure.  By forging links with the private sector, or with communities, governments 
can overcome these failures and break out of a low-level equilibrium trap.   
 
 Third, the same reason why it was possible to overcome government failure—by 
building coalitions with the private sector or communities—could create difficulties for 
scaling up to the next level.  The reason is that scaling up means these programs approach 
the scale of either the market or the government.  Yet it was a market failure or government 
failure (or both) that created the need for the program in the first place.  So as the scale 
increases, governments need to ensure that the original failure does not get reproduced in 
the new scaled-up program.   
 
 For donors who would like to support governments in their efforts to scale up 
poverty reduction, the implications are as follows.  That successful poverty reduction 
efforts can take place by government only programs (Bhoomi), private sector only 
(Operation Flood), partnerships between government and NGOs (Andhra Self-Help 
Groups) or with the private sector (Tamil Nadu), means that there is no single institutional 
arrangement that works everywhere and all the time. The cliché that one size does not fit all 
applies with exceptional force in this context.  If one arrangement works in one country, 
donors should contain their enthusiasm for advocating it in other countries.  At the same 
time, if a particular government is failing badly, donors should not necessarily lose hope.  
These same governments may build coalitions with partners and overcome some of their 
own failures.  Finally, donors too should be aware of the dilemmas facing countries in 
scaling up.  The very reason why a particular innovation succeeded, say by forming a 
partnership with community organizations, may be the reason why it is difficult to scale up.  
In short, we probably need to scale up something that is in short supply in the development 
community, namely, patience. 
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